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BOOK REVIEW

HOW JUDGES THINK
By RICHARD A. POSNER
CAMBRIDGE, MASS- HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS,

2008

Pp. 387, $29.95
t
Reviewed by Paul Brickner

Cocooned in their marble palace, attended by sycophantic
staff, and treated with extreme deference wherever they go,
Supreme Court Justices are at risk of acquiring an
exaggeratedopinion of their ability and character.'I
Judge Richard A. Posner, one of the great legal scholars of this
generation,2 has produced a study that applies his vast scholarship and
extraordinary analytical abilities to better our understanding of the
tUniversity of Richmond, B.A., 1962; Case Western Reserve University, J.D., 1966;
Cleveland State University, LL.M., 1983. Retired U.S. Administrative Law Judge; former
Appellate Judge, U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals; Past President, State Board of
Education (Ohio); recipient, John R. Quine Adjunct Faculty Award, University of Akron School
of Law.
IRicHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 306 (2008).
2 A University of Chicago web page lists more than fifty books that he has authored or
co-authored and articles and book reviews too numerous to count. List of Publications,
Presentations, and Works in Progress by Richard A. Posner, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
faculty/posner-r/ppw.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). Judge Posner is Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a Senior Lecturer at the University of
Chicago Law School, and a former Stanford Law School Professor. Curriculum Vitae of
Richard A. Posner, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r/cv.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2009). He has spoken widely, at the University of Michigan Law School, see infra note 7 and
accompanying text, and has also spoken at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179 (1986).
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judicial process and judicial thinking, reasoning and behavior. At
first, his book seems to be a more comprehensive version of thenJudge Benjamin N. Cardozo's enduring study, The Nature of the
Judicial Process, which was published eleven years before Justice
Cardozo joined the U.S. Supreme Court. 3 However, Judge Posner
provides much more mental substance and detail than Cardozo's
slender classic.
Benjamin N. Cardozo was elected in 1913 to a seat on the New
York Supreme Court, a trial court.4 In 1914 a few weeks after his
term commenced, Governor Martin H. Glynn elevated him to the
New York Court of Appeals, that state's highest court. 5 The new
judge made quite a name for himself. By 1921 he was invited to
speak at Yale Law School.6 He told the Dean at first that "he had 'no
message to deliver."',7 However, while he visited with the Dean and
faculty, then-Judge Cardozo was asked if he could tell the students
how he decided his cases and other questions that flowed naturally
from the first question.8
Judge Cardozo repeated those questions in his introductory
lecture, 9 the first of four that he delivered at Yale Law School before
an enthusiastic audience that grew so large a more spacious venue
was required to accommodate the crowd.' 0 When he concluded, the
audience gave the judge a standing ovation."' The lecture format
required reasonable parameters and length. In turn, those factors
helped focus the short work into a well read and frequently reprinted
memorable classic.
The legal profession is interested not in how judges think in
general, but how they think in deciding cases. We are concerned with
those decisional thought processes that are the cornerstone of the
judicial process at the trial and appellate levels. At the time of his
study, Cardozo had been a Judge of the New York Court of Appeals;
he did not become an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
until 1932. Although Judge Posner provides some discussion of how
trial judges think, his study is largely one about the mental processes
of federal appellate judges.
3BENJAMIN

N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (192 1).

See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDozo: A STUDY INREPUTATION 2-3 (1990).
5See id at 3; ANDREw L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 127-28 (1998).
6 KAUFMAN, supra note 5, at 203.
4

7Id.
8 Id. at 203--04.

9CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 10 ("What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what
sources of information do I appeal for guidance? In what proportions ... ?)
10 KAUMAN supranote 5, at 204.

11Id
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Judge Posner is no stranger to the life and work of Justice
Cardozo. He delivered a series of lectures on Justice Cardozo at the
University of Michigan Law School in 1989 that were published the
following year by the University of Chicago Press.'12 As a result, we
should not be surprised that many insights provided by Judge
Cardozo in 1921 are given once again by Judge Posner in 2008. Both
write from the perspective of the appellate judge--Cardozo of the
state court system and Posner of the federal court system.
While Judge Cardozo's analysis provides four methods of deciding
4
cases,'13 Judge Posner provides nine theories of judicial behavior.'1
Judge Posner' s excellent work is always interesting, if at times unduly
analytical and complex. He writes about the impact on the decisionmaking process of those few judges who harbor ambitions for higher
office.'15 A politically savvy judge might want to curry favor with the
appointing authority or might want to avoid disenchanting a governor
who might be headed for the U.S. Senate.'16 But most judges, he
states, often simply want to be regarded as good judges who decide
their cases on a non-political basis.'17 Posner makes frequent
8
references to judges wanting to be good judges.'1
He begins by telling the readers that the fact that judges "do not
deliberate (by which I mean deliberate collectively) very much is the
real secret."' 9 He does not venture an explanation. However, Posner' s
small information point provides readers with a major insight into the
appellate judicial process. Outsiders who think that collective
deliberation is a cornerstone of the judicial process at the appellate
level will find Posner' s revelation disquieting and even startling. He
observes that collective deliberation among appellate judges in a case
is less than that of jurors.2
Judge Posner discusses many issues that are tangential to or
supplement the concept of judicial thinking. One such interesting
topic that Judge Posner addresses is whether American courts,
particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, should cite the decisions of
foreign courts and opinions of legal officials of foreign nations .2 '1This
POSNER, Supra note 4, at vii.
CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 30-3 1.
14 POSNER, supra note 1, at 19.
15 Id at 30, 134, 142.
16 Id. at 142.
17 Id. at 73, 305.
18Id at 12, 59-62, 65, 69-71, 282.
'9 Id at 2; cf id at 302 (commenting on the deliberation preferences of brilliant
(Frankfuter) versus duller colleagues on the court).
20 Idat 34.
21 Id at 347-53.
12
13
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question, involving sources of authority, has stirred some public
controversy. More than eighty years earlier, Cardozo had also
addressed the issue.
Judge Posner in his introduction writes of "the quest for global
judicial consensus" and "the Supreme Court's increasing propensity
to cite foreign judicial decisions as authorities in American
constitutional cases. ,,22 Judge Posner is somewhat critical of Justice
Stephen Breyer for being "an enthusiastic citer of foreign
constitutional decisions."2 He disparages those citations as "a form of
elitism, for decisions by foreign courts are not events in American
democracy.",24 Continuing his discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's

citations to decisions of "an international or other foreign

Court ,

25

Judge Posner's accompanying footnote cites ten law review articles
on point, all published in the last few years,2 which indicate that the
issue is a hot one. He criticizes of the use of a foreign decision
for its precedential effect by judges (more particularly
Supreme Court Justices) searching for a global consensus on
an issue of U.S. constitutional law. That search is the latest
hopeless effort to ground controversial Supreme Court
judgments in something more objective than the Justices'
political preferences. Earlier generations sought legal fixity in
natural law .... 2
Focusing on American precedents, Judge Posner reminds us that
we have to distinguish between controlling authorities and those that
are not controlling, such as decisions by another state supreme court
or federal court of appeals. He emphasizes that citing to foreign
precedents does not add to American jurisprudence:
Citing foreign decisions is an effort to further mystify the
adjudicative process, as well as to disguise the political
character of the decisions at the heart of the Supreme Court's
constitutional jurisprudence. The more political a court, the
harder it tries to appear nonpolitical.2

22 Id

at 14.

Id at 340.
24 Id
25 Id at 347.
23

26
27
28

See idat347n. 1.
Id. at 348.
Idat350.
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Judge Posner continues to make clear his opposition to much of
this modem judicial practice. He views our Supreme Court as a
political court.
To cite foreign law as authority is to suppose fantastically
that the world's judges constitute a single community of
wisdom and conscience. That is the position the Justices are
gesturing toward when they try to justify their citation of
foreign decisions as authority by invoking a "decent respect
to the opinions of mankind," a phrase in the Declaration of
Independence that they have taken out of context and by
29
doing so have inverted its meaning.
He goes on to remind us that the Declaration of Independence's
reference to ""'..a decent respect to the opinions of mankind""'.. in
context meant that it ""'..requires that they should declare the causes
which impel them to the separation.."..' 30 The phrase was not intended
to suggest that we look to decisions of foreign courts for guidance or
precedent.
Judge Posner tells us that those Justices who like to cite foreign
courts are "sophisticated cosmopolitans." 3 1 He then asks, "[b]ut are
they not arrogant, even usurpative, in trying to impose their
cosmopolitan values on Americans in the name of our eighteenth32
century Constitution?"

As always, Judge Posner makes good sense. He references a case
involving the death penalty where Justice Breyer, in dissenting from a
denial of certiorari, cited legal authority from Jamaica, India, Canada,
and Zimbabwe.3
In his earlier study, Cardozo similarly wrote of "borrowing from
other systems.",34 His was an early twentieth century view based on a
late nineteenth century legal education. He spoke of Roman law and
said that Lord Mansfield, Chancellor Kent, and Justice Story "were
never weary of supporting their judgments by citations from the
Digest.",35 Cardozo's use of the phrase "never weary" implies that he
did not agree with that usage. But, of Roman law, he wrote,
29
30

Id. at 35 1-52 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 352 n.9 (quoting Eugene Kontorovich, The Opinion of Mankind, N.Y. SUN, July

1, 2005, at 9).
31
32

33

Id
Id
Id at 352 n.8 (citing Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting

from denial of certiorari)).
34 CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 123.
35 Id
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Authority it never had. The great historic movement of the
Reception did not touch the British Isles. Analogies have
been supplied. Lines of thought have been suggested. Wise
solutions have been offered for problems otherwise insoluble.
None the less, the function of the foreign system has been to
advise rather than to command. . . . It is only one
compartment in the great reservoir of social experience and
truth and wisdom from which the judges of the common law
must draw their inspiration and their knowledge.3
Judges Cardozo and Posner are on the same page when it comes to
''other systems,'' whether those systems are Roman law or decisions
of modem-day foreign courts and legal officials.
In expounding on his views of the cur-rent judicial system, Judge
Posner speaks highly of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 37 and of some
of our other great American jurists of earlier days: Holmes, Brandeis,
Cardozo, and Hand.3 But he has critical comments for Chief Justice
John Roberts 39 and Justice Breyer. 40 He suggests that Chief Justice
Roberts injured his reputation for candor by his testimony at his
judicial confirmation hearings, 41I and he uses language like "a failed
effort to theorize a political prg a' in describing portions of
Justice Breyer's new book, Active Liberty. 3
Judge Posner notes that appellate judges engage occasionally in
legislating."4 He writes that routine cases are ordinarily decided with
legalistic reasoning and analysis, while others require more careful
judicial scrutiny. In similar fashion, Judge Cardozo noted, "[o]f the
cases that come before the court in which I sit, a majority, I think,
could not, with semblance of reason, be decided in any way but
one.'A5
Judge Posner is also critical of the modem-day academy.
Professors at the elite law schools, he tells us, are unrealistic about the
Supreme Court and are little interested in the judicial process of either
lower federal courts or state courts.4 He suggests "that the faculties
36
37
38

Id. at 123-24 (footnote omitted).
POSNER, supra note 1, at 15 1.
Idat 63-64.

39 Id.

at 81.

4( Idat 322-42.
41

Idat8l1.

42

1dat 327.

43 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION

(2005).
44
45
46

POSNER, supra note 1, at 78-92.
CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 164.
See POSNER, supranote 1, at 12.
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of the elite law schools are becoming alienated from the judiciary.'A
His criticisms are carefully measured and are delivered with great
authority.
Both Posner and Cardozo have much to say about precedent.
Cardozo tells us that it is "when there is no decisive precedent, that
the serious business of the judge begins."4 8 He explains that, "He
must then fashion the law for the litigants before him. In fashioning it
for them, he will be fashioning it for others.... The sentence of today
will make the right and wrong of tomorrow."" 9 Judge Posner indexes
a plethora of listings under precedent and notes that the work of trial
judges is not precedential.
Wadzo
rote i
that
We cani see f-rm this disnceIn
more optimistic vein because he wrote as a judge who was influenced
by the enlightenment's belief that the progress of mankind will
continue to be enhanced by science and reason. He also wrote as
someone influenced by the Darwinian concept of evolution, a concept
that seemed to view evolution as creating improved species and a
higher order of animal life.5 0
Judge Posner, a scholar of a different generation, knows that
science and reason, although at a peak in Germany, did not prevent
the horrors of Nazism. Although he speaks of judges wanting to be
good judges, he seems to imply that there are bad judges who engage
in conscious falsification and twisting of facts . 5 '1Although he does not
emphasize these unsavory aspects of the judicial process, he at least
recognizes that they exist, although they can be attributed often to
error and mistake. He writes of Holocaust deniers as a type of
irrational thinkers. Business school scholars have written about errors
in management. We can learn from our mistakes, but error and
mistake do not appear to mesh with the idea that legal reasoning and
analysis lead to more perfect adjudicating.5
Posner, a modern day realist, can be considered a modern day
Cardozo. Except for Justice Scalia, no member of the judiciary
approaches his exceptional level of scholarly and judicial
'-"

47

Id

48

Idat21.

49 Id

50 Cardozo suggested that THOMAS HuxLEY, LAY SERMONS (1870) was his BibleHuxley was a Darwinian and agnostic. See BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, Values:
Commencement Address, in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMINE NATHAN CARDOZO: THE
CHOICE OF TYCHO BRAHE (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947).
51 POSNER, supra note 1, at 69-70.
52 See SYDNEY FINKELSTEIN, JO WHITEHEAD & ANDREW CAMPBELL, THINK AGAIN:
BAD DECISIONS AND HOW To KEEP IT FROM HAPPENING TO YOU
WHYv GOOD LEADERS MA&KE
(2009).
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achievement. "Posner the Prolific" he was called once by the Journal
of Legal Education.5 His vast range of scholarship is incorporated
into this volume: law and economics, anti-trust law, law and
literature, Bayesian analysis, labor market analysis, sociology,
psychology and plain old human nature.
Judge Posner leaves almost no stone unturned. He even brings up
the use of doublets in the law.5 Doublets in our language of the law
often are not redundancies but rather the result of the merger of the
Anglo-Saxon and Norman French strands of modern day legal
English. The most discernable example is "last will and testament."
"Will" is Germanic or Anglo-Saxon and testament is obviously
derived from the Latin or Norman French. Members of both linguistic
families were brought into the fold."
Judge Posner's work measures up to his own extraordinary
standards of scholarship. He is no sophisticated cosmopolitan, but a
regular guy and a brilliant and outspoken scholar who reminds us that
judges are not law professors. This study is both fascinating and
important. His primary message-how judges think-is often
matched with fascinating sidebar discussions of other issues, as noted
above, including the "rightness" or correctness of Brown v. Board of
Education.5 Never timid, he also reminds us that Justices are
humans, too, as well as "workers."
Cocooned in their marble palace, attended by sycophantic
staff, and treated with extreme deference wherever they go,
Supreme Court Justices are at risk of acquiring an
exaggerated opinion of their ability and character. In a
democratic society of great size and complexity, it is difficult
to justify giving a committee of lawyer aristocrats the power
not just to find or apply the law and make up enough law to
fill in the many gaps in the law that is given to them, but also
to create out of whole cloth, or out of their guts, large
swatches of law that as a practical matter they alone can
alter.5

53 Joseph P. Tomnain, Augustine in Chicago, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 610 (2001) (reviewing
MARK LILLA, THE RECKLESS MIND: INTELLECTUALS IN POLITICS (2001) and RICHARD A.
POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE (200 1)).
54 POSNER, supra note 1, at 248.

55 See Dennis McKenna, And the Verdict Is ... Many Legal Doublets Are Superfluous and
Unnecessary, PROTEUS, Vol. 18, Summer 2009, at 24.
56 POSNER, supra note 1, at 279, 345 (discussing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954)).
57

Id. at 306.
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His book is important because it provides readers with insight into
the many factors that enter into the thought processes of judges. The
legalistic manner of deciding cases may be satisfactory for those
cases that can be decided only one way, but aside from those judges
must engage in serious consideration of many factors. It is here that
Posner leaves his mark.
Judge Posner has written a forceful and highly readable study of
judicial thinking, judicial reasoning, and the judicial process. He
weaves into the book his great wealth of knowledge of the social
sciences, political science, psychology, and economics. His
remarkable erudition is evidenced by innumerable footnoted sources
and authorities. He may have overindulged in intellectual gymnastics
by describing the judge's evaluation of the truthfulness of witnesses
in terms of the Bayesian decision theory. But his comments are
thought provoking. The reader will come away from the book
understanding that the hunch as a form of decisonmaking has its
shortcomings. Judge Posner offers sound insights into varying topics:
the judge as a labor-market participant and as a legislator; judicial
salaries and tenure; and internal and external constraints on judges.
He stresses that judges are not law professors. Judges decide cases;
they do not engage in academic discussions of issues.

